



Securing the Sun Fire™ 12K and 15K Domains

Updated for SMS 1.2

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Securing Sun Fire™ 12K and 15K Domains

This Sun BluePrints™ OnLine article documents security modifications that you can implement on Sun Fire 12K and 15K domains without adversely affecting its behavior. The configuration changes described in this article enable Solaris™ Operating Environment (OE) security features and disable other potentially insecure services and daemons.

This article is one in a series that provides recommendations for enhancing the security of a Sun Fire system. Before securing the domains, we recommend that you use the “Securing the Sun Fire 12K and 15K System Controller: Updated for SMS 1.2” article to secure Sun Fire 12K and 15K system controllers.

This article contains the following topics:

- “Goal” on page 2
- “Background Information” on page 3
- “Securing Sun Fire Domains” on page 15
- “Verifying Domain Hardening” on page 27
- “About the Authors” on page 31
- “Related Resources” on page 32

Goal

The Sun Fire™ 12K and 15K servers are the largest Sun servers currently sold and are used for projects and deployments ranging from server-consolidation projects in financial institutions to extremely sensitive data-storage applications at government agencies. Such deployments require that systems be secured against unauthorized access and misuse by malicious individuals.

Sun Fire domains introduce a variable to Solaris OE systems through platform-specific software components (for example, daemons) and services. These platform-specific software components impact the processes and procedures that must be used to secure the Solaris OE configuration running on Sun Fire domains. To properly secure Sun Fire domains, you must understand the impact of these new software components and have access to a well-documented and well-supported configuration to identify which modifications are appropriate and which would not be appropriate.

The goal of this Sun BluePrints OnLine article is to provide a sample baseline security configuration for Sun Fire domains by describing and implementing all supported Solaris OE security modifications. After reading about the Sun tested and supported configuration in this article, you'll understand how the configuration of a secured Sun Fire domain differs from the secured configurations of other Sun systems.

If your system requires any of the services that we recommend disabling, then the sample configuration in this article may not be appropriate. Other configurations that do not implement all of the security modifications in this article are acceptable. However, we recommend that you carefully evaluate services and daemons not disabled to verify that they are required and that they are carefully protected against misuse.

To automate the installation of security software and implementation of security modifications, we provide a customized driver in the Solaris™ Security Toolkit.

Background Information

The following sections provide helpful information for understanding security issues involving Sun Fire domains, hardware and software requirements, and other topics. This section contains the following topics:

- “Assumptions and Limitations” on page 3
- “Obtaining Support” on page 5
- “Default Domain Software and Configurations” on page 5
- “Domain Security Options in SMS 1.2” on page 8
- “Solaris OE Defaults and Modifications” on page 9

Assumptions and Limitations

In this article, our recommendations are based on several assumptions and limitations as to what can be done to secure Sun Fire domains.

Our recommendations assume a platform based on the following characteristics:

- Solaris 8 OE 2/02 (Update 7) software or later
- System Management Services (SMS) 1.2 software
- SUNWCall Solaris OE cluster
- Sun Quad FastEthernet™ card installed in each domain
- Solaris OE minimization is not discussed in this article, but is supported

Using other software versions and platform characteristics may produce results that vary from those presented in this article.

A Solaris OE configuration hardened to the degree described in this article may not be appropriate for all environments. When installing and hardening a Solaris OE instance, you can perform fewer hardening operations than are recommended. For example, if your environment requires Network File System (NFS)-based services, you can leave them enabled. However, hardening beyond that which is presented in this article should not be performed and is neither recommended, nor supported.

Note – Standard security rules apply to hardening Sun Fire domains: *That which is not specifically permitted is denied.*

Solaris OE hardening can be interpreted in many ways. For purposes of hardening Sun Fire domains, we address hardening all possible Solaris OE options. That is, anything that can be hardened, is hardened. When there are good reasons for leaving services and daemons as they are, we do not harden or modify them.

You can harden Sun Fire domains automatically during a JumpStart™ installation of the operating system (OS), or you can harden it after the installation of the OS. This article documents the process for manually hardening a domain after the OS installation, because addressing the JumpStart environment is beyond the scope of this article.

For information about setting up a JumpStart server and integrating the Solaris Security Toolkit software with a JumpStart server, refer to the following Sun BluePrints OnLine articles:

- “The Solaris™ Security Toolkit - Quick Start: Updated for version 0.3”
- “Building a JumpStart™ Infrastructure”

In this article, we do not describe the installation of the Solaris OE 2/02 SUNWCall cluster and do not detail the initial configuration of Sun Fire 12K or 15K domain software. Refer to the product documentation for more information on how to install domain software. Instead, in this article, we focus on the tasks for securing a domain. These tasks include installing security-related software, installing the latest patch clusters, and hardening the OS. This hardening is critical to the security of the domain, because the default configuration of Solaris OE may not provide the required level of security.

Note – Although this article focuses on domains built using the SUNWCall Solaris OE installation cluster, using the Solaris OE cluster is not required. Other Solaris OE installation clusters containing fewer packages can be installed on Sun Fire domains. Also, individual packages can be removed from these clusters. Solaris OE minimization is supported on Sun Fire domains just as it is on other Sun systems.

Obtaining Support

Sun Fire 12K and 15K domain configurations implemented by the Solaris Security Toolkit domain driver are Sun supported configurations.

The Solaris Security Toolkit provides an error free, standardized mechanism for performing the hardening process, and it enables you to undo most changes after they are made. Although we do not require that you use the Solaris Security Toolkit to harden domains, we strongly recommend it.

Note – Sun supports hardened and minimized domains whether security modifications are performed manually or by using the Solaris Security Toolkit software.

Please note that the Solaris Security Toolkit is not a supported Sun product; only the end-configuration created by the Solaris Security Toolkit is supported. Solaris Security Toolkit support is available through the Sun™ SupportForum discussion group at:

<http://www.sun.com/security/jass>

Default Domain Software and Configurations

This section describes the default packages, daemons, startup scripts, and other configurations of Sun Fire domains. Although not all of these affect the security of the system directly, from a security perspective, you should always be aware of them and their impact on the system.

Default Packages

The following Sun Fire domain-specific packages are installed as part of the SUNWCall cluster:

system	SUNWdrctx	Dynamic Reconfiguration Modules for Sun Fire 15000 (64-bit)
system	SUNWckmr	Init script & links for Sun Fire 15000 Key Management daemon
system	SUNWckmu	Key Management daemon for Sun Fire 15000
system	SUNWckmx	Key Management Modules for Sun Fire 15000 (64-Bit)

The Sun Fire domain software does not change the `/etc/passwd`, `/etc/shadow`, or `/etc/group` files. This behavior differs from the Sun Fire System Management Services (SMS) software on the system controller (SC), which modifies these files.

Default Daemons

The Sun Fire domain-specific daemons are as follows:

root	11	1	0	17:28:32	?	0:00	/platform/SUNW,Sun-Fire-15000/lib/cvcd
root	121	1	0	17:28:46	?	0:00	/usr/platform/SUNW,Sun-Fire-15000/lib/sckmd

Dynamic Reconfiguration Daemons

Although they are not Sun Fire 12K nor 15K domain-specific, the following daemons are used for dynamic reconfiguration on Sun Fire domains.

Do not disable the following daemons:

root	324	1	0	07:47:24	?	0:00	/usr/lib/efcode/sparcv9/efdaemon
root	58	1	0	05:32:57	?	0:00	/usr/lib/sysevent/syseventd
root	60	1	0	05:32:57	?	0:00	/usr/lib/sysevent/syseventconfd
root	65	1	0	05:32:59	?	0:00	devfsadmd
root	371	1	0	05:33:12	?	0:00	/usr/lib/saf/sac -t 300
root	631	295	0	16:30:34	?	0:00	/usr/lib/dcs

Startup Scripts

Sun Fire daemons are started by several startup scripts including the `/etc/init.d/cvc` and `/etc/init.d/sckm` scripts.

Domain-to-System Controller Communication

The additional network used on Sun Fire domains to communicate with the Sun Fire system controller (SC) is defined similarly to regular network connections through an `/etc/hostname.*` entry.

This `/etc/hostname.dman0` entry sets up the I1 or domain-to-SC Management Network (MAN). The IP address in our example, 192.168.103.2, is defined for this domain as follows:

<pre># more /etc/hostname.dman0 192.168.103.2 netmask 255.255.255.224 private up</pre>
--

From a security perspective, the network between the domains and the SC, in addition to any network connection between the domains, is of concern. The I1 network mitigates these concerns by permitting only SC-to-domain and domain-to-SC communication.

The I1 network is implemented as separate point-to-point physical network connections between the SCs and each of the 9 domains supported by a Sun Fire 12K system or 18 domains supported by a Sun Fire 15K system. Each of these connections terminates at separate I/O boards on each domain and SC.

On the SCs, these multiple separate networks are consolidated into one meta-interface to simplify administration and management. The MAN driver software performs this consolidation, enforces domain separation, and fail overs to redundant communication paths.

Direct communication between domains over the I1 network is not permitted by the hardware implementation of the I1 network. By implementing the network in this manner, each SC-to-domain network connection is physically isolated from other connections.

The network configuration appears as follows:

```
dman0: flags=1008843<UP,BROADCAST,RUNNING,MULTICAST,PRIVATE,IPv4>
mtu 1500 index 2 inet 192.168.103.2 netmask fffffffe0 broadcast
192.168.103.31 ether 8:0:20:be:f8:f4
```



Caution – Although the `dman0` network supports regular Internet Protocol (IP)-based network traffic, it should only be used by Sun Fire management traffic. Any other use of this internal network may affect the reliability, availability, and serviceability (RAS) of the entire platform. Refer to the `scman` (7D) and `dman` (7D) man pages for more information.

System Controller-to-Domain Communication

All Sun Fire SC-to-domain communication over the MAN network is authenticated through IPsec. The IPsec protocol suite provides authentication services at the IP layer as defined by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). For additional information about IPsec, refer to RFC 2411 at <http://www.ietf.org>.

Unauthorized attempts to access Sun Fire domains or SC-specific daemons generate `syslog` messages indicating that an access attempt was made. The `syslog` message is generated by IPsec because the request fails the authentication check required for all MAN-based traffic. A log message appears as follows:

```
Sep 20 08:04:26 sun15-a ip: [ID 993989 kern.error]
ip_fanout_tcp_listen: Policy Failure for the incoming packet (not
secure); Source 192.168.181.252, Destination 010.001.073.042.
```

Domain Security Options in SMS 1.2

To improve network performance on the MAN network, sequential MAC addresses are used by default on each of the up to 18 domains. With this configuration, it is straightforward to determine what the MAC address is of any given domain. It is, therefore, possible for a domain to broadcast gratuitous address resolution protocol (ARP) information containing erroneous MAC addresses. The SC accepts these malicious MAC packets and uses them to misroute packets destined for domains. To protect against this type of ARP spoofing attack and other IP-based attacks, two options are available beginning with SMS 1.2:

- Disable ARP on the I1 MAN network between the SCs and domains.
- Disable all IP traffic between the SC and a domain by excluding that domain from the SCs MAN driver

Disabling ARP on the MAN network provides some protection against ARP attacks, but it still leaves all other IP functionality present in the I1 network. If more stringent security is required, disabling all IP traffic between the SCs and one or more individual domains on the I1 network may be necessary. Instructions for implementing these two options are provided later in this article.

If a domain is excluded from the MAN network, the domain-to-SC network interface `dman0` is not configured at installation time. Even if the `dman0` interface is manually configured, the domain cannot communicate with the SC because the domain is excluded from the SC perspective. This solution provides excellent protection for a Sun Fire 12K or 15K chassis against malicious domains attempting to attack either the SC or other domains in the chassis. We recommend this solution for environments that require strongly enforced separation between domains and the SCs.

The Solaris Security Toolkit supports disabling ARP on the I1 MAN network as an option. You can modify a copy of the Sun Fire domain module of the `sunfire_15k_domain-secure.driver` to use the `s15k-static-arp.fin` hardening script. This hardening script is not enabled by default.

When all IP traffic between SCs and domains is disabled by the SC configuration, some functionality over the MAN network is not available. The unavailable services are as follows:

- Dynamic reconfiguration (DR) from the SC: commands such as `addboard`, `removeboard`, `deleteboard`, and `rcfgadm` cannot be used for domains excluded from the I1 MAN network
- I1 MAN domain-console access from the SC
- IP-based services from the SC such as network time protocol (NTP) and JumpStart or Flash-based OS installations

Domain-side DR is available for domains that are excluded from the MAN network. Console access to the domains is available because console traffic can use either the internal I1 MAN network or an Input Output Static Random Access Memory (IOSRAM) based communication path. The IOSRAM interface is totally separate from the TCP/IP based MAN connection. Services using the IOSRAM interface, such as domain booting, remain available even if IP traffic to one or more domains is disabled.

Ultimately, security policy and enterprise application requirements may be the deciding factor as to which option is most suitable. Disabling ARP on the MAN network provides some protection for domains against ARP attacks, but it still leaves all the functionality present in the MAN network. If more stringent security is required, disable all IP traffic between the SCs and one or more individual domains on the MAN network.

To enforce strict separation between a domain and all other domains and SCs in a Sun Fire high-end chassis, we recommend that the domain be excluded from the MAN network. This change can be performed only on the SC. For instructions on how to make these SC modifications, refer to the BluePrint OnLine article titled “Securing Sun Fire 12K and 15K System Controllers: Updated for SMS 1.2.”

Solaris OE Defaults and Modifications

The Solaris OE configuration of Sun Fire domains has many of the same issues as other default Solaris OE configurations. For example, too many daemons are used and other insecure daemons are enabled by default. Some insecure daemons include: `in.telnetd`, `in.ftpd`, `fingerd`, and `sadmind`. For a complete list of default Solaris OE daemons and security issues associated with them, refer to the “Solaris Operating Environment Security: Updated for Solaris 8 Operating Environment” Sun BluePrints OnLine article.

Based on the Solaris OE installation cluster (SUNWCall) typically used for Sun Fire domains, almost 100 Solaris OE configuration modifications are recommended to improve the security configuration of the Solaris OE image running on Sun Fire domains.

Implementing these modifications is automated when you use the driver script `sunfire_15k_domain-secure.driver` available in the Solaris Security Toolkit. An updated version of this driver is available in version 0.3.8 and later of the Solaris Security Toolkit.

Disabling Unused Services

We recommend that you disable all unused services. Reducing services offered by Sun Fire domains to the network decreases the access points available to an intruder. The modifications to secure Sun Fire domains result in reducing the number of TCP, UDP, and RPC services available from a domain.

The security recommendations in this article include all Solaris OE modifications that do not impact required Sun Fire domain functionality. This does not mean these modifications are appropriate for every domain. In fact, it is likely that some of the services disabled by the default `sunfire_15k_domain-secure.driver` script will affect some applications. Because applications and their service requirements vary, it is unusual for one configuration to work for all applications.

Note – A secured configuration must be considered in the context of the application and services provided. The secured configuration implemented in this article is a *high-water mark* for system security; every service not required is disabled. Using the information in this article, you can determine clearly what can be disabled without adversely affecting the behavior of Sun Fire domains in your environment.

Recommendations and Exceptions

Our recommendations for securing Sun Fire domains follow closely with the hardening described in the “Solaris Operating Environment Security - Updated for Solaris 8 Operating Environment” Sun BluePrints OnLine article.

Solaris Basic Security Module (BSM) is *not enabled*. The BSM subsystem can be difficult to optimize for appropriate logging levels and produces log files which may be time consuming to interpret. This subsystem should only be enabled at sites where you have the expertise and resources to manage the generation and data reconciliation tasks required to use BSM effectively.

For more information on how to configure BSM, refer to the Sun BluePrint OnLine article titled “Auditing in the Solaris 8 Operating Environment.”

Mitigating Security Risks of Solaris OE Services

Detailed descriptions of Solaris OE services and recommendations on how to mitigate their security implications are available in the following BluePrint OnLine articles:

- “Solaris Operating Environment Security - Updated for the Solaris 8 Operating Environment”
- “Solaris Operating Environment Network Settings for Security - Updated for Solaris 8”
- “Solaris Operating Environment Minimization for Security - Updated for Solaris 8”

The recommendations in these articles are implemented with the Solaris Security Toolkit software in standalone and JumpStart modes.

Using Scripts to Perform Modifications

You can implement the recommendations using the Solaris Security Toolkit in either standalone or JumpStart mode. The three drivers used by the Solaris Security Toolkit to harden Sun Fire domains are as follows:

- `sunfire_15k_domain-secure.driver` (executes the other drivers)
- `sunfire_15k_domain-config.driver`
- `sunfire_15k_domain-hardening.driver`

The modifications performed by these drivers are organized into the following categories:

- Disable
- Enable
- Install
- Remove
- Set
- Update

For more detailed information about what each of the scripts do, refer to the Sun BluePrints OnLine article titled “The Solaris Security Toolkit - Internals - Updated for Version 0.3.”

In addition to these modifications, the Solaris Security Toolkit copies files from the Solaris Security Toolkit distribution to increase the security of the system. These files are system configuration files that change the default behavior of `syslogd`, system network parameters, and other Solaris OE options.

The following sections briefly describe the categories and the modifications the scripts within the drivers perform to harden Sun Fire domains. For a complete list of the scripts in the `sunfire_15k_domain-secure.driver`, refer to the Solaris Security Toolkit `Drivers` directory.

Disable Scripts

These scripts disable services on the system. Disabled services include the NFS client and server, the automounter, the DHCP server, printing services, and the window manager. The goal of these scripts is to disable all of the services that are not required by the system.

A total of 31 disable scripts are included with the Sun Fire domain-hardening driver. These scripts impose the following modifications to disable all, or part, of the following services and configuration files:

TABLE 1 Scripts Affected By Domain Hardening

apache	lpsched	printd
aspppd	mipagent	rpcbind
automountd	mountd	sendmail
core generation	nfsd	slp
dhcp	nscd	smcboot
dtlogin	pam.conf	snmpdx
IPv6	picld	snmpXdmid
keyservd	pmconfig	syslogd
ldap_cachemgr	lpsched	

Enable Scripts

These scripts enable the security features that are disabled by default on Solaris OE. These modifications include:

- Enabling optional logging for `syslogd` and `inetd`
- Requiring NFS clients to use a port number below 1024
- Enabling process accounting
- Enabling improved sequence number generation per RFC 1948
- Enabling optional stack protection and logging

Although some of these services are disabled by the Solaris Security Toolkit, optional security capabilities present are still enabled so that they are used securely if used in the future.

Install Scripts

These scripts create new files to enhance system security. In the Sun Fire driver, the following Solaris OE files are created to enhance the security of the system:

- An empty `/etc/cron.d/at.allow` file to restrict access to `at` commands.
- An updated `/etc/ftpusers` file with all system accounts restricts FTP access to the system.
- An empty `/var/adm/loginlog` to log unsuccessful login attempts.
- An updated `/etc/shells` file to limit which shells can be used by system users.
- An empty `/var/adm/sulog` to log `su` attempts to `root`.

In addition to creating the preceding files, some install scripts add software to the system. On Sun Fire domains, the following software is installed:

- Recommended and Security Patch Clusters
- MD5 software
- OpenSSH software
- FixModes software

Remove Scripts

Only one remove script is distributed with the Sun Fire driver; it removes unused Solaris OE system accounts. The accounts that are removed are no longer used by the Solaris OE and can safely be removed. The removed accounts include:

- `smtp`
- `nuucp`
- `listen`
- `nobody4`

Set Scripts

These scripts configure the security features of the Solaris OE that are not defined by default. A total of 13 scripts are distributed with the Sun Fire domain driver and can configure the following optional Solaris OE features not enabled by default:

- root password
- ftpd banner
- telnetd banner
- ftpd UMASK
- Login RETRIES
- Power restrictions
- SUID on removable media
- System suspend options
- TMPFS size
- User password requirements
- User UMASK

Update Scripts

These scripts update the configuration files that are shipped with the Solaris OE and that do not have all of their security settings properly set. Modifications are made to the following configuration files:

- `at.deny`
- `cron.allow`
- `cron.deny`
- `logchecker`
- `inetd.conf`

The modifications made to the `inetd.conf` file include disabling all of the entries the Solaris OE includes in the `/etc/inetd.conf` file. Disabling these entries turns off all interactive access mechanisms to the domain including Telnet, FTP, and all of the `r*` services. Console access to the domains is not affected.

Securing Sun Fire Domains

Building a secure system requires that entry points into the system be limited and restricted, in addition to limiting how authorized users obtain privileges. To effectively secure Sun Fire domains, changes are required to the Solaris OE software running on Sun Fire domains.

To secure Sun Fire domains, perform the following:

- “Adding Security Software” on page 15
- “Customizing the Solaris Security Toolkit Driver” on page 21 (optional)
- “Overriding Solaris Security Toolkit Defaults” on page 23 (optional)
- “Installing Downloaded Software and Implementing Modifications” on page 24

Adding Security Software

The first stage in hardening Sun Fire domains requires downloading and installing additional software security packages. This section covers the following tasks:

- “Install Solaris Security Toolkit Software” on page 16
- “Download Recommended Patch Cluster Software” on page 17
- “Download FixModes Software” on page 18
- “Download OpenSSH Software” on page 19
- “Download the MD5 Software” on page 20

Note – Of the software described in this section, the Solaris Security Toolkit, Recommended and Security Patch Cluster, FixModes, and MD5 software are required. On Solaris 9 OE systems, the version of Secure Shell bundled with the OE can be used instead of OpenSSH. Also, on both Solaris 8 OE and Solaris 9 OE systems, a commercial version of Secure Shell can be used. You must install a Secure Shell product on Sun Fire domains.

Install Solaris Security Toolkit Software

The Solaris Security Toolkit software must be downloaded first, then installed on Sun Fire domains. Later, you'll use the Solaris Security Toolkit software to automate installing other security software and implementing the Solaris OE modifications for hardening the domains.

The primary function of the Solaris Security Toolkit software is to automate and simplify building secured Solaris OE systems based on the recommendations contained in this and other security-related Sun BluePrints OnLine articles.

Note – The following instructions use filenames that are correct only for version 0.3.8 and later of the Solaris Security Toolkit software.

▼ To Download Solaris Security Toolkit Software

1. Download the latest version of the source file.

At the time of this publication, the version is `SUNWjass-0.3.8.pkg.Z`. The source file is located at:

```
http://www.sun.com/security/jass
```

2. Extract the source file into a directory on the server by using the `uncompress` command:

```
# uncompress SUNWjass-0.3.8.pkg.Z
```

3. Install the Solaris Security Toolkit software onto the server by using the `pkgadd` command:

```
# pkgadd -d SUNWjass-0.3.8.pkg SUNWjass
```

Executing this command creates the `SUNWjass` subdirectory in `/opt`. This subdirectory contains all Solaris Security Toolkit directories and associated files. The script `make-jass-pkg`, included in Solaris Security Toolkit software releases since version 0.3, allows administrators to create custom packages using a different installation directory.

Download Recommended Patch Cluster Software

Patches are regularly released by Sun to provide Solaris OE fixes for performance, stability, functionality, and security. It is critical to the security of a system that the most up-to-date patches are installed. Ensure that the latest Solaris OE Recommended and Security Patch Cluster is installed on the Sun Fire domains; this section describes how to download the latest patch cluster.

Downloading the latest patch cluster does not require a SunSolve OnLineSM program support contract.

Note – Apply standard best practices to all patch installations. Before installing any patches, evaluate and test them on non-production systems or during scheduled maintenance windows.

▼ To Download Recommended Patch Cluster Software

1. **Download the latest patch from the SunSolve OnLine Web site at:**

`http://sunsolve.sun.com`

2. **Click on the Patches link at the top of the left navigation bar.**
3. **Select the appropriate Solaris OE version in the Recommended Solaris Patch Clusters box.**

In our example, we select Solaris 8 OE.

4. **Select the best download option, either HTTP or FTP, with the associated radio button, then click Go.**

A Save As dialog box is displayed in your browser window.

5. **Save the file locally.**
6. **Move the file securely to the Sun Fire 12K or 15K domains with the `scp` command, or `ftp` if Secure Shell is not available.**

The `scp` command used should be similar to the following:

```
% scp 8_Recommended.zip sun15-a:/var/tmp
```

7. Move the file to the `/opt/SUNWjass/Patches` directory and uncompress it as follows:

```
# cd /opt/SUNWjass/Patches
# mv /var/tmp/8_Recommended.zip .
# unzip 8_Recommended.zip
Archive:      8_Recommended.zip
  creating: 8_Recommended/
  inflating: 8_Recommended/CLUSTER_README
  inflating: 8_Recommended/copyright
  inflating: 8_Recommended/install_cluster
[. . .]
```

Later, using the Solaris Security Toolkit software, you'll install the patch after downloading all the other security packages.

Note – If you do not place the *Recommended and Security Patches* software into the `/opt/SUNWjass/Patches` directory, a warning message displays when you execute the Solaris Security Toolkit software.

Download FixModes Software

FixModes is a software package that tightens the default Solaris OE directory and file permissions. Tightening these permissions can significantly improve overall security of Sun Fire domains. More restrictive permissions make it even more difficult for malicious users to gain privileges on a system.

▼ To Download FixModes Software

1. Download the FixModes pre-compiled binaries from:

http://www.sun.com/blueprints/tools/FixModes_license.html

The FixModes software is distributed as a precompiled and compressed tar file formatted for systems based on SPARC technology. The file name is `FixModes.tar.Z`.

2. Once downloaded, move the file securely to the Sun Fire 12K or 15K domains with the `scp` command, or `ftp` if Secure Shell is not available.

The `scp` command used should be similar to the following command:

```
% scp FixModes.tar.Z sun15-a:/var/tmp
```

3. Save the file, `FixModes.tar.Z`, in the Solaris Security Toolkit Packages directory in `/opt/SUNWjass/Packages` with the following commands:

```
# cd /opt/SUNWjass/Packages
# mv /var/tmp/FixModes.tar.Z .
```



Caution – Leave the file in its compressed state.

Later, using the Solaris Security Toolkit software, you'll install the FixModes software after downloading all the other security packages.

Download OpenSSH Software

In any secured environment, the use of encryption in combination with strong authentication is required to protect user-interactive sessions. At a minimum, user interactive sessions must be encrypted.

The tool most commonly used to implement encryption is Secure Shell software, whether a commercial or open source (freeware) version. To implement all the security modifications performed by the Solaris Security Toolkit software and recommended in this article, you must implement a Secure Shell software product.

Information on where to obtain commercial versions of Secure Shell is provided in “Related Resources” on page 32.

Note – If a domain is running Solaris 9 OE, we recommend that you use the Sun-provided implementation of Secure Shell bundled with the OE. If using the Solaris version of Secure Shell, omit the OpenSSH installation steps in this section.

The Solaris Security Toolkit software disables all non-encrypted user-interactive services and daemons on the system, in particular daemons such as `in.rshd`, `in.telnetd`, and `in.ftpd`.

Note – If you choose to use a Secure Shell product other than OpenSSH, install and configure it before or during the Solaris Security Toolkit software run.

Access to the system can be gained with Secure Shell similarly to what is provided by RSH, Telnet, and FTP.

▼ To Download OpenSSH Software

- Obtain the following Sun BluePrints online article and use the instructions in the article for downloading the software.

A Sun BluePrints OnLine article about how to compile and deploy OpenSSH titled “Building and Deploying OpenSSH on the Solaris Operating Environment” is available at:

<http://www.sun.com/blueprints/0701/openssh.pdf>

Later, using the Solaris Security Toolkit software, you’ll install the OpenSSH software after downloading all the other security packages.



Caution – Do not compile OpenSSH or install compilers on Sun Fire 12K or 15K domains just to compile OpenSSH. Use a separate Solaris OE system—running the same Solaris OE version, architecture, and mode (for example, Solaris 8 OE, Sun4U, and 64 bit)—to compile OpenSSH. If you implement the Secure Shell bundled with Solaris 9 OE or a commercial version of Secure Shell, then no compilation is required.

Download the MD5 Software

The MD5 software validates MD5 digital fingerprints on the Sun Fire domains. Validating the integrity of Solaris OE binaries provides a robust mechanism to detect system binaries that are altered or *trojaned* (hidden inside something that appears safe) by unauthorized users. By modifying system binaries, attackers provide themselves with back-door access onto a system; they hide their presence and cause systems to operate in unstable manners.

▼ To Download the MD5 Software

1. Download the MD5 binaries from the following web site:

http://www.sun.com/blueprints/tools/md5_license.html

The MD5 programs are distributed as a compressed tar file.

2. Move the file `md5.tar.Z` securely to the Sun Fire 12K or 15K domains with the `scp` command, or `ftp` if `scp` is not available.

The `scp` command used should be similar to the following

```
% scp md5.tar.Z sun15-a:/var/tmp
```

3. **Copy the file, `md5.tar.Z`, to the Solaris Security Toolkit Packages directory in `/opt/SUNWjass/Packages`.**

Caution – Do not uncompress the tar archive.

After the MD5 software is saved to the `/opt/SUNWjass/Packages` directory, the execution of the Solaris Security Toolkit installs the software.

After the MD5 binaries are installed, you can use them to verify the integrity of executables on the system through the Solaris Fingerprint Database. More information on the Solaris Fingerprint Database is available in the Sun BluePrints OnLine article titled “The Solaris™ Fingerprint Database - A Security Tool for Solaris Software and Files.”

4. **(Optional) Download and install Solaris Fingerprint Database Companion and Solaris Fingerprint Database Sidekick software from the SunSolve Online web site at:**

`http://sunsolve.sun.com`

We strongly recommend that you install these optional tools and use them with the MD5 software. These tools simplify the process of validating system binaries against the database of MD5 checksums. Use these tools frequently to validate the integrity of the Solaris OE binaries and files on the cluster nodes.

These tools are described in the “The Solaris™ Fingerprint Database - A Security Tool for Solaris Software and Files” article.

Customizing the Solaris Security Toolkit Driver

If you determine that your system requires some of the services and daemons disabled by the Solaris Security Toolkit, or you want to enable any of the inactive scripts available in the Solaris Security Toolkit, do so before executing the Solaris Security Toolkit.

As discussed earlier in this article, the SMS 1.2 software provides new capabilities for securing the MAN network which are as follows:

- Disable ARP on the MAN network.
- Disable all I1 IP traffic for one or more domains.

Disabling all I1 IP traffic to domains can only be done on the SC. Refer to the BluePrint OnLine article titled “Securing Sun Fire 12K and 15K System Controllers, Updated for SMS 1.2” for details on how this is done.

Disabling ARP on the MAN network can only be done for an entire chassis. It is not possible to make this change only for certain domains. It must be done on all domains having IP connectivity to the I1 network.

Using the Solaris Security Toolkit to disable ARP on the domains requires modifications to the default files distributed with the Solaris Security Toolkit.

Note – We recommend that the SCs be secured first, particularly when implementing static ARP between the SCs and domains. If the SCs are not secured and validated, do not proceed with implementing static ARP. Complete the hardening process of the SCs first.

▼ To Disable ARP on the I1 MAN Network

1. To add the necessary features or customize the hardening required for your system, edit a copy of the `sunfire_15k_sc-hardening.driver` file:.

```
# cd /opt/SUNWjass/Drivers
# vi sunfire_15k_sc-hardening.driver
```



Caution – To preserve your changes for future updates and prevent the Solaris Security Toolkit from overriding your changes, modify only a copy of the driver. Keep the original Solaris Security Toolkit driver as a master.

2. If ARP is being disabled on the I1 MAN network, uncomment `s15k-static-arp.fin` from the driver by removing the `#` symbol in front of the script. After you edit the line, it should appear as follows in the `JASS_SCRIPTS` definition:

```
s15k-static-arp.fin
```

3. Review the floating IP Address and matching MAC address of the SC in the `sms_domain_arp` file.

This file is in the `/opt/SUNWjass/Files/etc` directory. The Solaris Security Toolkit uses the following initial values in this file:

```
192.168.103.1          08:00:20:63:49:1e
```


- a. If your site configuration for the MAN network uses a different floating IP address for the SC, replace the `192.168.103.1` value with your IP floating address.
- b. If your site configuration requires a different MAC address than the initial `08:00:20:63:49:1e` value, replace it with the MAC address that matches the floating IP address on all domains and both SCs.

All the domains must use the same `/etc/sms_domain_arp` file.



Caution – The floating IP address in this file must match the IP address chosen as the floating IP address for the SC on the I1 MAN network. Any mismatches will cause MAN network failures. These failures can adversely affect the reliability, availability, and serviceability (RAS) of the platform.

4. Reboot the domains to implement the modified settings.

You must reboot the domains for these settings to take effect.

Overriding Solaris Security Toolkit Defaults

If there are some services that must remain enabled, and the Solaris Security Toolkit automatically disables them, you can override the defaults before executing the driver.

To prevent the toolkit from disabling a service, comment out the call to the appropriate finish script in the driver.

For example, if your environment requires Network File System (NFS)-based services, you can leave them enabled. Comment out the `disable-nfs-server.fin` and `disable-rpc.fin` scripts by appending a `#` sign before them in the copy of the `sunfire_15k_domain-hardening.driver` script.

For more information about editing and creating driver scripts, refer to the Sun BluePrints OnLine article titled “The Solaris™ Security Toolkit - Installation, Configuration, and Usage Guide: Updated for version 0.3.”

Installing Downloaded Software and Implementing Modifications

The Solaris Security Toolkit version 0.3.8 and later provides a driver (`sunfire_15k_domain-secure.driver`) for automating the installation of security software and Solaris OE modifications. The driver performs the following tasks:

- Installs and executes the FixModes software to tighten file system permission
- Installs the MD5 software
- Installs the Recommended and Security Patch Cluster software
- Implements almost 100 Solaris OE security modifications

Note – The actions performed by each of the scripts is described in the Sun BluePrints OnLine article “The Solaris Security Toolkit - Internals: Updated for Version 0.3.” The hardening described is performed in standalone mode, not JumpStart mode, because the Sun Fire domains were built using an interactive Solaris OE installation. For details on the differences between standalone mode and JumpStart mode, refer to the Solaris Security Toolkit documentation.

Note – During the installation and modifications implemented in this section, all non-encrypted access mechanisms to Sun Fire domains —such as Telnet, RSH, and FTP—are disabled. The hardening steps do not disable console access from Sun Fire 12K or 15K SCs.

▼ To Install Downloaded Software and Implement Changes

- **Execute the `sunfire_15k_domain-secure.driver` script as follows:**

```
# cd /opt/SUNWjass
# ./jass-execute -d sunfire_15k_domain-secure.driver
./jass-execute: NOTICE: Executing driver,
sunfire_15k_domain-secure.driver

=====
sunfire_15k_domain-secure.driver: Driver started.
=====
[...]
```

▼ To View the Contents of the Driver File

- **To view the contents of the driver file and obtain information about the Solaris OE modifications, refer to the Solaris Security Toolkit documentation available either in the `/opt/SUNWjass/Documentation` directory or through the web at:**

<http://www.sun.com/security/jass>

For information about other scripts in the Solaris Security Toolkit software, refer to the Sun BluePrints OnLine article titled “Solaris Security Toolkit Internals: Updated for Version 0.3.”

▼ To Undo a Solaris Security Toolkit Run

Each Solaris Security Toolkit run creates a run directory in `/var/opt/SUNWjass/run`. The names of these directories are based on the date and time the run is initiated. In addition to displaying the output to the console, the Solaris Security Toolkit software creates a log file in the `/var/opt/SUNWjass/run` directory.



Caution – Do not modify the contents of the `/var/opt/SUNWjass/run` directories under any circumstances. Modifying the files can corrupt the contents and cause unexpected errors when you use Solaris Security Toolkit software features such as undo.

The files stored in the `/var/opt/SUNWjass/run` directory track modifications performed on the system and enable the `jass-execute` undo feature.

- To undo a run or series of runs, use the `jass-execute -u` command.

For example, on a system where seven separate Solaris Security Toolkit runs are performed, you could undo them by using the following command and options:

```
# pwd
/opt/SUNWjass
# ./jass-execute -u
Please select from one of these backups to restore to
1.  December 10, 2001 at 19:45:15 (/var/opt/SUNWjass/run/20011210194515)
2.  December 10, 2001 at 19:25:22 (/var/opt/SUNWjass/run/20011210192522)
3.  December 10, 2001 at 19:07:32 (/var/opt/SUNWjass/run/20011210190732)
4.  December 10, 2001 at 19:04:36 (/var/opt/SUNWjass/run/20011210190436)
5.  December 10, 2001 at 18:30:35 (/var/opt/SUNWjass/run/20011210183035)
6.  December 10, 2001 at 18:29:48 (/var/opt/SUNWjass/run/20011210182948)
7.  December 10, 2001 at 18:27:44 (/var/opt/SUNWjass/run/20011210182744)
8.  Restore from all of them
Choice? 8
./jass-execute: NOTICE: Restoring to previous run
//var/opt/SUNWjass/run/20011210194515

=====
undo.driver: Driver started.
=====
[...]
```

Refer to the Solaris Security Toolkit documentation for details on the capabilities and options available in the `jass-execute` command.

Note – Software installations and actions performed by other software are not undone by the Solaris Security Toolkit undo feature. For example, the installation of OpenSSH, FixModes, and MD5 is not undone. In addition, the modifications performed by FixModes are not automatically undone.

Verifying Domain Hardening

After you complete the hardening process for each domain, reboot the domain and test the configuration by having the domain perform the tasks it should be capable of. At a minimum, make sure that each of the services provided by a hardened domain are running and functioning properly.

Check any additional software installed on the domain to validate that it is functioning properly. Ideally, use existing quality assurance or acceptance testing and scripts to verify that hardened domain is working properly and that the hardening process has not adversely affected any required features.

For our sample configuration, the modifications reduced the TCP and UDP services listening from 93 to 4. Similarly, the registered RPC services went from 149 to 0. These results represents a significant improvement in the security of the Solaris OE on each domain.

After we hardened each domain, installed appropriate versions of Secure Shell, and the rebooted the system, the only network services that are available in our sample configuration are as follows:

```
# netstat -a
```

UDP: IPv4							
Local Address	Remote Address	State					

.		Unbound					

TCP: IPv4							
Local Address	Remote Address	Swind	Send-Q	Rwind	Recv-Q	State	

.	*.*	0	0	24576	0	IDLE	
*.cvc_hostd	*.*	0	0	24576	0	LISTEN	
*.sun-dr	*.*	0	0	24576	0	LISTEN	
*.32772	*.*	0	0	24576	0	LISTEN	
*.22	*.*	0	0	24576	0	LISTEN	

TCP: IPv6							
Local Address	Remote Address	Swind	Send-Q	Rwind	Recv-Q	State	If

.	*.*	0	0	24576	0	IDLE	
*.cvc_hostd	*.*	0	0	24576	0	LISTEN	
*.sun-dr	*.*	0	0	24576	0	LISTEN	
*.22	*.*	0	0	24576	0	LISTEN	

Active UNIX domain sockets						
Address	Type	Vnode	Conn	Local Addr	Remote Addr	
3000b987cb8	stream-ord	3000b989c98	00000000	/var/spool/prngd/pool		

After hardening, the daemons left running are as follows:

```
[sun15-a/] uname -a
SunOS sun15-a 5.8 Generic_108528-11 sun4u sparc SUNW,Sun-Fire-15000
[sun15-a/] ps -ef
```

	UID	PID	PPID	C	STIME	TTY	TIME	CMD
root	0	0	0	19:26:36	?	0:02		sched
root	1	0	0	19:26:36	?	0:00		/etc/init -
root	2	0	0	19:26:36	?	0:00		pageout
root	3	0	0	19:26:36	?	0:00		fsflush
root	394	1	0	19:27:05	?	0:00		/usr/lib/saf/sac -t 300
root	286	1	0	19:26:55	?	0:00		/usr/lib/utmpd
root	246	1	0	19:26:53	?	0:00		/usr/platform/SUNW,Sun-Fire-15000/lib/sckmd
root	11	1	0	19:26:38	?	0:00		/platform/SUNW,Sun-Fire-15000/lib/cvcd
root	59	1	0	19:26:45	?	0:00		/usr/lib/sysevent/syseventd
root	61	1	0	19:26:45	?	0:00		/usr/lib/sysevent/syseventconfd
root	68	1	0	19:26:47	?	0:00		devfsadmd
root	279	1	0	19:26:55	?	0:00		/usr/sbin/nscd
root	254	1	0	19:26:53	?	0:00		/usr/sbin/inetd -s -t
root	262	1	0	19:26:53	?	0:00		/usr/sbin/syslogd -t
root	265	1	0	19:26:54	?	0:00		/usr/sbin/cron
root	397	394	0	19:27:05	?	0:00		/usr/lib/saf/ttymon
root	305	1	0	19:26:56	?	0:00		/usr/lib/efcode/sparcv9/efdaemon
root	325	1	0	19:26:58	?	0:00		/opt/OBSDssh/sbin/prngd --cmdfile /etc/prngd.conf --seedfile /etc/prngd-seed /v
root	378	1	0	19:27:04	?	0:00		/opt/OBSDssh/sbin/sshd
root	407	1	0	19:27:56	?	0:00		/usr/lib/sendmail -ql5m
root	631	1	0	19:28:34	?	0:00		/usr/lib/dcs

We perform an additional check to validate the services available on the domain using `nmap`, as follows:

```
# ./nmap -p 1-65535 -ss -sU 10.0.0.200
```

Using the popular freeware network scanner `nmap` command, this port scan is performed from a system external to the Sun Fire 12K or 15K frame. For more information about the `nmap` command, visit <http://www.insecure.org/nmap>.

Our scan verified that only the following network services are available from outside the frame of the Sun Fire 15K domain:

```
Starting nmap V. 2.54BETA22 ( www.insecure.org/nmap/ )
Interesting ports on xc4p02-b11.blueprints.Sun.COM (10.0.0.200):
Port      State      Service
22/tcp    open      ssh
442/tcp   filtered  cvc_hostd
665/tcp   filtered  sun-dr

Nmap run completed -- 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 3 seconds
```

The scan generated the following syslog error messages:

```
Sep 20 08:04:26 sun15-a ip: [ID 993989 kern.error]
ip_fanout_tcp_listen: Policy Failure for the incoming packet (not
secure); Source 129.148.181.252, Destination 010.001.073.042.

Sep 20 08:04:27 sun15-a last message repeated 1 time

Sep 20 08:04:28 sun15-a sshd[357]: [ID 800047 auth.error] error:
setsockopt SO_KEEPALIVE: Invalid argument

Sep 20 08:04:29 sun15-a ip: [ID 993989 kern.error]
ip_fanout_tcp_listen: Policy Failure for the incoming packet (not
secure); Source 129.148.181.252, Destination 010.001.073.042.

Sep 20 08:04:30 sun15-a last message repeated 1 time
```

These error messages were generated by the IPsec authentication mechanism on the domain when scanned by nmap. Error messages are produced because the nmap IP packets did not conform to the IPsec security policies used to protect those ports. IPsec is used to authenticate all Sun Fire system traffic traversing the I1 or MAN internal network.

About the Authors

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Alex Noordergraaf has over 10 years experience in the areas of computer and network security. As the Security Architect of the Enterprise Server Products (ESP) group at Sun Microsystems, he is responsible for the security of Sun midframe and high-end servers. He is the co-founder of the very popular freeware Solaris Security Toolkit. Before joining ESP he was a Senior Staff Engineer in the Enterprise Engineering (EE) group of Sun Microsystems, where he developed, documented, and published security best practices through the Sun BluePrints program. Published topics include security for Sun Fire servers, Sun Cluster software, Sun Fire Midframe servers, Sun Enterprise 10000 servers, N-tier environments, the Solaris OE, and the Solaris OE network settings. He co-authored the Sun BluePrints publication, *JumpStart™ Technology: Effective Use in the Solaris™ Operating Environment*.

Prior to his role in EE, he was a Senior Security Architect with Sun Professional Services where he worked with many Fortune 500 companies on projects that included security assessments, architecture development, architectural reviews, and policy/procedure review and development. He developed and delivered an enterprise security assessment methodology and training curriculum to be used worldwide by SunPSSM. His customers included major telecommunication firms, financial institutions, ISPs, and ASPs. Before joining Sun, Alex was an independent contractor specializing in network security. His clients included BTG, Inc. and Thinking Machines Corporation.

Dina K. Nimeh

Dina Nimeh is a Senior Software Engineer with 15 years of experience in many areas from device drivers to databases. For the past four years, Dina has focused on secure software development and the deployment of security system solutions such as vulnerability assessment tools, intrusion detection systems, and public key infrastructures. Currently, she works with the Enterprise Systems Group at Sun Microsystems.

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